Lost in translation

Toward an Arab History of the “Middle Classes”
Rūz al-Yūsuf, 12 mai 1958
© Ahmed Abd al-Quddus
The same word does not always tell the same story. In Nasser’s Egypt, the concept of the “middle class” underwent numerous transformations. By tracing these changes, Antoinette Ferrand shows that this terminology reveals very different conceptions of society.

My thesis is, so to speak, a history of language—that is, a history of misunderstandings. While contemporary historiography on the Middle East abounds with studies on the “modernization” of Arab societies in the 20th century—including widespread access to education, the development of a “culture,” and “mass consumption”—it often fails to acknowledge the very existence of the groups it claims to study: the Arab middle classes. Yet the term “middle class” (al-ṭabaqa al-wusṭā or al-ṭabaqa al-mutawassiṭa) has indeed been in use in Arabic since the late 19th century and draws primarily on French liberal philosophy—and, to a lesser extent, British philosophy: it refers to a political entity composed of educated Egyptians whose mission was to liberate the country from British rule and to modernize it. During the 1930s and 1940s, however, the term’s meaning shifted until, under the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1970), it came to refer to a constellation of social groups defined by sociological criteria, capable of characterizing the stage of national development.

La classe moyenne, Rūz al-Yūsuf, 7 avril 1958

La classe moyenne, Rūz al-Yūsuf, 7 avril 1958 

© Ahmed Abd al-Quddus

I thus became interested in this gradual conceptualization of the term “middle class” as a sociological indicator, since it represents the point of collision between two philosophies that run through Egyptian ruling and intellectual circles.
On the one hand, the revolutionary regime adopted a functionalist socialist ideology—in the Yugoslav style—that sought to defuse the class struggle by redistributing its professional groups.

Dessin de presse illustrant les élections au sein de l’Union nationale, Rūz al-Yūsuf, 15 juin 1959

Autour de Nasser, dépeint en chef de chantier, défile chaque composante de la nation, femmes, paysans, ouvriers et intellectuels. Dessin de presse illustrant les élections au sein de l’Union nationale, Rūz al-Yūsuf, 15 juin 1959

© Ahmed Abd al-Quddus

Nasser and his officers do not call for the dictatorship of the proletariat but for the creation of a classless society in which individuals are assigned tasks: farmers work the land, workers process raw materials, intellectuals provide ideological leadership, the military defends the country, and national capitalism provides (regulated!) financing for the economy.

In this “new society,” there is no “middle class”: the term, with its negative connotations, refers to the educated elites of the interwar period who failed in their national mission—that of liberating the country. In this respect, it does not differ greatly from the “guilty bourgeoisie,” the central antagonist in communist and socialist narratives during the Cold War.
On the other hand, Nasserist leaders were not immune to the developmentalist doctrines that spread around the globe after World War II, the success of which depended on defining a middle social stratum. As Egypt’s population reached 25 million in the mid-1960s, the main challenge of defining a “middle class” in numerical and sociological terms reflected both the need to assess the country’s position in the chronology of developmental stages and to measure the successes of the Revolution (such as the dismantling of agrarian feudalism or the rise in the standard of living). Egyptian social science experts then undertook a considerable scientific effort to define and measure contemporary socioeconomic phenomena, including the formation of “middle classes.”

The multifactorial definition of the “middle classes” that emerged at that time highlighted the various thresholds for belonging to these target populations of the Egyptian welfare state. Beyond the traditionally identified boundaries (public-sector employees, university graduates), a vast array of profiles emerged (skilled technicians, independent artisans, graduates of technical secondary schools), whose livelihoods were far more meager than those of refrigerator buyers—whom the excessively nostalgic national memory identifies as the archetypes of the Nasserist middle class. There were no household appliances in these households, where meat was not eaten every week.
Herein lies the main contribution of the Egyptian scholarly literature I have drawn upon in my work: what Western observers—and historians subsequently—presented in terms of deprivation or lack—the “poor middle classes,” the “proto-middle classes”—Egyptian intellectuals and social scientists saw as the very nature of these social strata: a predominantly urban population, in the process of becoming educated and with limited means of subsistence.

Far from being merely anecdotal, this sheds light on the understanding of this term in the Arab world, at a time when Egypt was the greatest producer of social knowledge in the Arabic language. On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, around 1960, the term “middle class” expressed both the aspiration for a better future and the fear of never achieving it.

Antoinette Ferrand, French Institute of Oriental Archaeology
2025 Winner of the Mattei Dogan Prize for Social History on an International Topic

Rūz al-Yūsuf, 12 mai 1958

À parcourir de droite à gauche : après avoir reçu son salaire, le petit fonctionnaire règle ses dettes auprès des commerçants du quartier, avant de rentrer les mains vides au foyer. Les petits urbains vivaient souvent à crédit. « Le premier du mois », Rūz al-Yūsuf, 12 mai 1958

© Ahmed Abd al-Quddus

Article published in the fourth issue of the FMSH Journal.

Published at 19 November 2026