The shadow of empire in the modern world.

I was asked in this lecture to consider the inheritance of colonial rule for post-colonial societies across the world. By far the most extensive and complete investigation of this topic has been carried out by economic historians, who have discussed the 'development of under-development' in the context of 'world systems theory'. The drain of wealth from colonial societies; the frustration of early industrialisation in them by colonial laissez faire ideologies; the over taxation of the peasantry, have, it is argued, contributed to the profound inequalities of wealth and opportunities in most parts of the non-Western world which are only now beginning to be lessened. Yet in this lecture, I want to point to the moral, social and political, rather than the purely economic consequences of European empire for the extra-European world.

Empire and the re-definition of race

It is appropriate to start with the issue of the legacy of empire for racial attitudes. Empire spread white populations across the globe, heightening ideologies of racial supremacy which were necessary to sustain the legitimacy of those empires. Equally, the end of empire, far from diminishing racism or racial ideologies in world politics, served instead to reinvigorate them as immigrants from former colonies flooded into Western Europe and North America as their economies boomed after the end of the Second World War. Played down by many historians of empire and its aftermath, racism was a critical aspect of both these phases.

In themselves racial attitudes were not, of course, simply a product of territorial empire. They were already present in the so called 'age of discovery, often tied to notions of religious supremacy. They are present in Shakespeare and the Southern European writers who belittled the 'Moors', a discourse which was later transferred to the Americas. Yet what Nicholas Dirks calls the 'ethnographic state' of nineteenth-century colonialism

certainly deepened and universalised racial discrimination. Colonial censuses, legal and prison systems categorised racial types and subordinated them to the dominant whites. Colonial systems of political representation discriminated against aboriginal and indigenous peoples. This discrimination often reached its peak towards the end of colonial rule, not at its beginning. Tellingly, it was also often particularly prevalent in societies which were the most liberal in relation to their white populations. So the condescension of the Dominion of Australia towards its aboriginal people after 1880 led to the disenfranchisement of the few who had received the vote before that date. Yet Australia had been one of the first countries in the world to concede votes to women and an adult franchise. Again, a figure such as H B Higgins who opposed colonial wars and argued fo9r Australian autonomy of Britain was vehement in his denunciation of Chinese and Indian emigration to the continent. Later, around 1900, aboriginal children and children of mixed race were removed from their parents by government action. Even up to the 1970s, the Australian government did its best to exclude Chinese and Indian migrants. Immigration remains a toxic issue in Australian politics, as this year's election and intervention by the United Nations shows.

Similarly, in South Africa it was the victory of the National Party in 1948 which initiated the high point of racial discrimination, with black people being shipped out of city suburbs to so-called Bantustans. Here again a mass electorate for whites had been established very early, largely as a bulwark against black representation. This is what Michael Mann, the sociologist calls, *The Dark side of democracy*. What ensued was a virtual race war in South Africa with black populations fighting back against discrimination and old land seizures by whites. The issue continues to envenom relations not only in South Africa, but in other African colonial territories such as Zimbabwe and Kenya, the latter still scarred by memories of the violent British campaign against Kikuyu rebels during the Mau Mau insurgency of the early 1950s. The massacres of Algerians both during the independence war and in Paris in 1961 paralleled these events in the former French Empire.

This climax of colonial racism, the results of which we still see today, was not simply a consequence of the wars of late imperialism, however. It was powered by the contempt generated by the racist ideologies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the legacy of Comte Gobineau, of social Darwinism, scientific eugenicism and the racial ideologies of the Southern States of America. It is important to remember that it was not only the right, buoyed by fascism, which promoted European racism. Self-styled socialists such as the British statistician, Karl Pearson, called for a 'race war' in the 1920s and even a liberal developmentalist, such as John Maynard Keynes, was a member of the British Eugenic Society. Nor was racial thinking confined to white Europeans and Americans. These ideas filtered into conceptions of the Indian caste system, as the untouchable leader B.R. Ambedkar noted. The historian, Gyanendra Pandey is working on the connection between American black liberation movements and the Indian debates about caste. Chinese, Vietnamese and Japanese also developed their own conception of racial hierarchies in which Africans, in particular, were often assigned to a lower status which they still occupy in the popular mind. In contemporary Thailand, Buddhist monks and politicians discriminate against Muslim Rohingas not simply because they are of a different religion, but because they are considered to be inferior.

As I mentioned earlier, mass immigration to European societies since the 1940s has generalised and reignited racial fears and racial discrimination, most recently in the form of Islamophobia. There were race riots in Britain as early as 1948 and since then black communities in city suburbs in Britain, France and even Sweden, have fought back against discrimination. The ideological base of racial antagonism has, however, shifted. During the late colonial period ideologies of racial supremacy were deployed against nationalist movements and in order to control the labour of colonised people. It was a hierarchical form. Now, the struggle is between parochial notions of rights, equity and entitlement, on the one hand, and trans-national understandings of the same entitlements, on the other: a lateral form of discrimination, as it were. Right-wing parties across the European world complain that immigrants are 'taking our jobs.' Politicians baulk at using national resources to fund foreign aid. Yet the dying hierarchical racism of empire sometimes merges with and empowers what we might call this exclusivist racialism of

equity. A British politician from a rightist party, UKIP, recently attacked foreign aid on the grounds that money should go to England, not to 'Bongo-Bongo Land.' The term 'Bongo-bongo Land' was a racist jibe at African countries, coined at the height of imperialism. Ironically, this politician was himself of Jewish origin. I would add, finally, on this issue, that the current debates on what is called 'liberal interventionism', both for and against, seem to me to be tinctured also with elements from the old racial ideologies of empire. It is no accident that the majority of states recently opposed to intervention in Syria had been the victims of formal or informal imperialism. Equally, many who opposed intervention over the past three decades have had recourse to a vulgar version of John Stuart Mill's 'principle of harm': 'let the barbarians fight with each other, as long as they do not harm us.' Supporters of intervention accuse those who use these arguments as 'Orientalists' at best, while they also repeat paternalist ideas of policing the world.

Urbanisation, the activist subject and the 'decline' of the peasant.

I have begun this talk by considering the legacy of imperialism for national and international ideologies of race sensibility, because historians and political scientists have understandably concentrated on the economic consequences of empire. I want now to go on to some related themes before coming more fully to these higher-level political and economic issues around empire. I am struck, firstly, by the manner in which the experience of empire has changed understandings of the person, the family and community across the world with consequences which are only beginning to play themselves out today. The historian Brian Hatcher has coined the term 'bourgeois Hinduism' for a this-worldly form of being in India, which stressed social activism and supposedly developed in India in the early nineteenth century, partly under the influence of Christian missionary activity. I will come on to religion and empire later. But here I want to suggest that formal and informal empire- along with their opponents- spread a notion of the activist subject which dissolved earlier social hierarchies and ranged far beyond religious belief and practice. The new form of subject emerged as an aspect of anti-colonialism; it was promoted by certain aspects of the colonial apparatus; at the same

time it was put in train by forces which were linked to colonialism, but part of global trends visible beyond colonial territories: population growth, and above all, urbanisation.

Direct colonial policies have tended to diminish status differences within non-European societies, while at the same time promoting class and sectional differences. Rich merchants came to stand on equal footing with Brahmins and mandarins. Tribal leaders, rajas and raises (magnates) have been forced into the same social categories as ordinary people both by colonial law and governance and also as a consequence of the mass mobilisation of anti-colonial movements. Conversely, colonialism has tended to strengthen vertical differences between people and these have often been extended, as post-colonial governments introduced majoritarian politics and consequently used resources to strengthen their own democratic resource base. So, for instance, groups designated Kikuyu were set against Luo; Ibo against others; Berbers against Arabs; Brahmins against non-Brahmins, and so on.

More significantly, the huge increase in the urban population, only beginning in the late colonial period has moved the percentage of those who live in towns and cities from at most 20% in 1900 to more than 60% today. The peasant, the key figure of the scholarship and political activism of the 1960s and '70s in the colonial world, has now been revealed as the century's greatest looser. While heavy colonial revenue regimes in rural areas and forced labour service certainly disadvantaged the rural poor, the massive increase in urban industrialism and the sale of rural land for development has pushed forward this process since the end of colonial rule. Colonialism therefore initiated, but did not complete the slow 'death of the peasant', who was regarded as the key agent of political change as late as the 1970s. In towns, society changes dramatically. Some advocates of the rights of the underprivileged, such as the Indian low caste leader Ambedkar, decried the village as a place of discrimination and a 'sink of backwardness'; Caribbean nationalists agreed, believing that towns would emancipate rural workers and break down racial barriers. Certainly, the rise of the town has seen a disintegration of the joint family, a limited growth of cross-status marriages and a limited empowerment of women. Yet urbanisation has also brought into sharp relief massive differentials in living standards,

health and mortality. Urban slums have replaced the impoverished dwellings of those once 'at the end of the village', as Ambedkar called them, on a huge scale.

Colonialism played a large part in initiating the restructuring of society across the world. Economic change and so-called globalisation since the 1980s speeded up many of these processes. But equally important, are the mental and moral changes which intersected with these social developments. I have already mentioned human divisions and racial attitudes, but here I want to move on to two more 'sources of social power' as the sociologist Michael Mann calls them: language and religion.

The colonialism of language.

One critical feature of the legacy of empire for today's globalised world lies in the area of language and communication. Of course, the earlier multi-ethnic empires broadened communication across their territories by spreading the use of Mandarin Chinese, Ottoman Turkish, Farsi and Urdu, for instance. But Western colonial empires created globalised languages on a much larger scale and these in turn influenced the earlier language forms. Spanish, English and French and, to a lesser extent Portuguese and Dutch, were exported and imposed on whole new territories. About 700 million people worldwide speak English in some form; perhaps 200 million, French. On the one hand, these imperial languages hastened communication in commerce, legal forms and in scientific and technical knowledge. On the other hand, they have served to deepen class, so-called-tribal and caste divisions across the world and have remained a source of conflict about entitlement, identity and cultural authenticity. Postcolonial writers, notably Homi Bhabha, have adapted Derrida's ideas to postulate that the 'epistemic violence' supposedly wrought by the imposition of these languages created 'fragmented subjectivity' and morally disempowered subject peoples.

I'll take up the case of English in the British and French in the colonial and post-colonial worlds. Clearly, in areas such as what became the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Caribbean, the nearly total extirpation of indigenous peoples reduced

their languages to philological antiquities. These have often only been revived as democratic politics has allowed local leaders to build constituencies by calling on marginal and minority groups to assert language rights. For instance, as New Zealand forces drew increasingly on the supposed 'martial' characteristics of the Maori in the two world wars, Vietnam and even Afghanistan, Maori language and supposed local forms of self-government have been allowed to flourish as a kind of 'pay off.' Some white New Zelanders now call themselves by the Maori word *pakeha*; others deplore the use of the word. Ironically, this word *pakeha* apparently first appeared in a letter of 1831 written by North Island Maori to the British king asking protection from the French 'strangers.' In the last two years a 'Maori 'political Party and a 'Pakeha party have entered New Zealand politics. Smaller and more harshly victimised peoples, such as the Australian Aboriginal peoples or Canadian Indians, have only more recently been able to assert their language and cultural rights as the global communication of the concept of 'native peoples' and leftist angst over their fate has infected world media.

The role of imperial languages in larger world societies has been subject to constant interrogation before and after decolonisation. In India, English began to spread from the end of the eighteenth century as a language of trade, government and law. In Bengal, merchant intermediaries with the British were called *dubash*es- literally 'people of two languages', *do bhasha*. But it was T. B. Macaulay, Law Member of the Governor General's council, who in 1835 penned a minute on the language of education in India which ignited controversies which have continued to the present. Even though nationalists and postcolonial scholars have asserted otherwise, Macaulay neither wished to uniformly impose English not completely marginalise Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. In fact he seems to have thought that a class of Indians 'English in taste and manners' would seed indigenous languages or 'dialects' as he called them with modern knowledge. Yet his violent rhetoric against Hindu culture, in particular, and his assertion that a shelf of English books was worth more than the whole of Oriental literature, continues to stir rage.

In the later stage of Nehru's government in the 1960s, right wing 'Hindu' parties annexed an anti-English message to their policies. Riots occurred. I vividly remember the denunciations of English as a colonial import and attacks on merchants in the city of Allahabad on the River Ganges at this time. I also remember the occasion when a shop keeper, his English signs destroyed by a mob, asked what the time was of one of the leaders of the protest. When shown the time, the shopkeeper smashed the agitator's expensive watch with a hammer, shouting 'these numbers are in English as well, aren't they!' A few months ago, the Taleban leader who wrote- in English- to the Pakistani schoolgirl, Malala Yousafzai, whom they had shot because of her support for women's education, damned Macaulay by name. He added 'Why do they want to make all human beings English? Because Englishmen are the staunch supporters and slaves of the Jews!'[1]

English survived and flourished, of course, in part because of its propagation among India elites through Roman Catholic schools and more recently Silicon Valley. It remained an essential 'link language' because, among other reasons, Hindi, though now the national language, was not acceptable in large parts of South India which belonged to non-Sanskritic language groups. Meanwhile, at a quieter level, some of the grammatical forms of English percolated into Indian regional languages and into Hindi simply as a result of the growth of communication.

Meanwhile, in other British Asian colonies, English has had a quieter life. Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia, have been the scene in recent years of controversies not about the use of English itself, as in India, but about the need to impose standard English on what has come to be called 'Singlish', Singapore English patois. The authoritative former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has taken a role as proponent of English, demonstrating that liberal imperialism still has its uses. English, he argued, was a common language between Chinese, Malays, Indians and resident Euro-Americans, an essential tool of national integration. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, local people have resisted the Chinese central government's attempts to impose Mandarin not only because they speak local Chinese language, but also as an assertion of political autonomy.

In Southeast Asia, French has had less staying power. Many of the leaders of the Viet Minh and later Viet Cong were fluent French speakers and some of the oldest generation still are. But, as North Vietnam and later Vietnam sought the support of the USSR, political leaders distanced themselves from the French inheritance and began to promote the use of Russian as their international language, especially in view of the large number of specialists who were travelling to the USSR, Eastern Europe and even the former African colonies. More recently again, English has made its appearance in schools and colleges, not because of Britain or even the USA, but because of the importance of Singapore and Malaysian English speakers in the regional economy.

French survived strongly, however, in West Africa as a link between local languages and ethnic communities. In Algeria, the independent government after 1962 first attempted to discourage the use of French, which had been the official language of the colony, and replace it with Arabic and Berber. Teachers were brought in from Egypt and Syria. But the value of French as a language of commercial, media and international communication meant that it could never be banished. The expansion of satellite television in the 1990s gave it a new thrust and now 33% of the Algerian population speak French while in the street, a mixture of French and Arabic is spoken. This media informed type of Franco-Arabic is rather different from the older mixture of French, Hebrew, Maltese and Arabic spoken by the French colons, as studied by Joelle Bahloul.

There is no doubt that the imposition of imperial languages from the time of the Spanish and Portuguese new world in the sixteenth century onward, has indeed tended to fragment consciousness and erected barriers of class and sensibility within colonised nations, as postcolonial writers argue. Many public intellectuals argue that the use of these former colonial languages has disempowered indigenous languages and perpetuated lateral social divisions. So, Sri Lankan Tamils denounce English as *kaduwa*-'the sword'-severing them from Sinhalese. In India radicals denounce the role of *kala angrez*, the 'black English' elites. Yet it is not clear either that the existence of a single indigenous national language, whether it is Japanese, or English in Britain, has in any way averted the development of social hierarchies.

Colonialism and religious radicalism

Perhaps an even more potent legacy of colonialism in the modern, globalised world lies in the area of religious identity. Not only did Western European empires and settler societies export and impose Christianity on other cultures, but non Christian religions became more coherent in doctrine and practice as a result of these encounters. A significant date here was the World Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893, which was attended by Swami Vivekananda on behalf of Hinduism and Anagarika Dharampala on behalf of Buddhism. Vivekananda went on to found the Ramakrishna Mission which remains a social activist Hindu society throughout the world. Dharampala helped underpin a sense of Sinhalese Buddhist identity in Ceylon/Sri Lanka to the present day and, along with linguistic difference, played a major part in fomenting the recent bloody civil war between the Tamil Tigers and Sinhala Buddhists.

If, therefore, the impact of colonialism and Western power resulted in a broadening, theorising and popularising of both Christianity and Islam and making 'other world religions', in Weber's sense, it also fomented conflicts between them. Apart from these broader changes, then, we might consider what might be called 'the rise of religious intransigence'. I'm referring to the proliferation, particularly since the 1950s of radical movements within several traditions: the RSS and various 'Hindutva' organisations within 'Hinduism', Salafi revivalist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood within Islam, even vigorous evangelical groups within Christianity. which have recorded great success in Africa and Latin America. We should beware, of course, of creating a simple teleology linking these late-twentieth century movements to colonialism. The fall of Communism in the late 1980s and the general development of democratic civil society organisations after independence; the role of youth unemployment and unrest, should all be taken into account. Yet the imprint of colonial government and the neo-colonialism of 'humanitarian intervention' by the USA and its allies remind us that there were deeper causative factors here.

The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, was founded in 1922 and waited ninety years to come to power in Egypt. It was created by Muslim scholars and young radicals who deplored the successful attempt of the British to perpetuate their power in the country through informal means when their administration formally gave up direct political power after the 1919 revolt. Again, the Brotherhood survived in the face of persecution by the quasi-secular military regime that survived in the country after British power waned at the end of the Second World War. Admittedly, neither in Egypt nor Iraq, nor in French Syria and Lebanon, nor even in the Shah's Iran, did the colonial powers anticipate the degree of opposition they encountered from young military leaders such as Nasser, the Baathists in Iraq or the Alawites in Syria or Khomeini in Iran. But their earlier refusal to condone anything like popular representation and tendency to play one party or ethnicity off against another guaranteed the sequence of events whereby the elitist secular inheritors of empire soon became embattled by popular and radical Islamist movements.

Another radical Muslim religious movement which also arose from the conflicts of colonialism was the Wahhabi branch of the faith which has become dominant in the Arabian Peninsula. but has also spread its influence across the world on the back of oil money. In 1926, Ibn Saud captured Macca and Madina, the two central places of Islam. This took place in the context of a conflict between the British Foreign Office, which supported the Hashemite dynasty, still tenuously in power in Jordan today, and the British Indian government which, supported, or at least remained neutral, in regard to Ibn Saud. Indeed, the tacit support of the colonial powers, particularly the British, French and Dutch, played an important part in normalising and generalising new forms of Islam through printing, newspapers and the organisation of steamships for the Hajj. Equally, though, colonial fear of sedition and religious unrest had the effect of radicalising and driving these movements underground. A classic example of this which has left a huge imprint on world history and the foreign policy of the Western world was, of course, the British relationship with Zionism. Having forwarded the idea of a Jewish homeland in 1917, the British drew back rapidly from the policy after the Arab revolt of 1936. Abrupt British withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate in 1948 created the conditions for the first Arab-Israeli war the consequences of which continue to envenom the region. Hizbullah

and parallel Sunni radical movements, including al-Qaeda itself all promote themselves as enemies of Israel.

Politics and the consolidation of ethnic difference

I now move on to political economy, an area in which the long-term impact of colonial rule for today's globalised world has been even clearer. Here, the dimensions I have mentioned before, racial attitudes, communication and religion were all intertwined in politics. I want first to consider the effects of the colonial policies of representation and social difference which links closely with the earlier discussion of religion and language. There is a widespread belief among nationalist historians and the general public, especially in Britain and Holland, that empires brought both the benefits of modern free trade and political representation, even democracy to non European peoples. One of the abler expressions of this was made by the British historian, Niall Ferguson, who now teaches, appropriately perhaps, at the Harvard Business School. The British and Dutch did, indeed, established limited forms of local representation, as had the Dutch before them. The French tended, by contrast, to create small electorates which could select indigenous representatives, properly Gallicised, to the French Assembly.

While these moves certainly spread ideas of voting and the selection of elites as intermediaries for the colonial power, they hardly represented the beginnings of democracy. In the case of British India, it was only by 1935 that the electorate had reached even 15% of the male population. Indian representatives in local politics were, moreover, hemmed in by governor's powers and the British Government of India, which was still dominated by colonial officials. Political activism was constrained by a stagnant form of laissez faire and insistence on 'small government' long after it had been dispensed with in the metropolis. The real breakthrough to Indian democracy came in 1938 and 1939, when the Indian National Congress opted for a full adult franchise, though with much foreboding that 'the nation was not ready, or not educated enough for power. Congress was influenced both by Gandhi's idea of the people united and also by a strong sense that social conflicts should be normalised. This incentive was even clearer

after the massacres of the Partition and the rise of untouchable demands. B. R. Ambedkar, the leader of the dalits or untouchables, was also the major draughtsman of the Indian Constitution of 1948 which remains in place today.

 A particularly potent and long-standing consequence of colonial political ideologies for the contemporary world was the practice of ethnic categorisation which brought together language, religion and class as political units, in turn encouraging local leaders to mobilise along these lines. This phenomenon occurred not only in formal colonial territories in Asia and Africa, but also in the informal realms of European (and American) domination, such as the Middle East, Central America, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

In the Middle East, forms of Ottoman government such as the millet system which hived off social politics to Christian priests and leaders or Shi'ite notables provided some degree of precedent for these colonial policies. But after the mid-nineteenth century and as European influence became overwhelming, ethnic categorisation of populations in regard to law and access to authority became yet more powerful. In Egypt, Syrian and Coptic and Mediterranean Christians and Jews could have their cases tried on different courts from the ordinary Muslim citizen. As direct colonial rule was imposed on much of the region during the First World War and the following Mandate System, such categories became the basis of politics. A particularly resonant example of this, which you will all be aware of, is the 1930 constitution of Syria-Lebanon, followed various risings of Sunni populations against French rule and compromises forged with Druze, Alawites and other Shias. In Iraq meantime, the British gave special privileges to the minority Sunni and Kurdish populations to buy their support in control of the Shi'ite majority. It hardly needs be said that much of the political instability today has arisen from attempts by these privileged minorities to protect their power from larger and increasingly radicalised minority populations.

In South and Southeast Asia, colonial concessions and favours to elite minority groups have similarly fashioned local politics up to the present day. The British gave Muslims and in South India, non-Brahmins, a role in various quasi-representative systems from the

1880s onwards. Although some Congress Muslims supported its decision to retreat from special electorates in the interwar period, the Pakistan project of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his successors was a direct consequence of this religio-ethnic categorisation. One does not need to regard Indian or Indonesian or Malay leaders as simple dupes of colonial government to recognise that the existence of such legal and political categories provided an easier route for political self-expression for leaders of minority groups than long-term engagement with majorities would have entailed.

One final element which brings together colonial political economy, ideology and social change was the development of civil society organisations, meaning a form of association-making, which in Jurgen Habermas's sense, lay between state and society, but interrogated both. The public creation of associations was a relatively late development in Europe itself, associated with representative bodies, the coffee house and heterodox religious associations such as the Quakers. In the colonised world forms of association and debate which pre-dated colonialism had also developed: discussions outside mosques and temples, poetic and political meetings or *mushaira*s, even the literary meetings in the houses of courtesans.

'High' colonial rule, however, greatly expanded the range of public associations in two distinct ways. Firstly, associations developed on the fringes of the very limited representative institutions through which the authorities tried to reduce the costs of direct government. So, for instance, rate payers' associations and 'peoples' associations' began to develop in colonial societies. Alongside this, the type of ethnic and religious categorisation described earlier also had the effect of bringing people together to protect their beliefs or sectional interests. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hindu Mahasabha in India represent examples of this sort of activity, as did the Central Kikuyu Association. Colonial pressure may have caused their formation, but thereafter, indigenous agency and local connections of marriage, education, military service, and so on, maintained and strengthened them. Importantly, associations such as these penetrated into society, particularly the new urban societies, creating new relationships between family, work, belief and subsistence. Ultimately, too, political ambition, government

oppression and new forms of communication brought representatives of these associations together in much broader groupings, which asserted that they represented the nation. The Indian National Congress, the Wafd in Egypt and the African National Congress are all examples of this form of amalgamation. All of them have exerted powerful influence on post-colonial politics in their respective societies. Critically, they spread radical and anti-colonial knowledge across the world, while at the same time appropriating many of the knowledge practices of the colonialists themselves. Even though, the Congress instituted English-language subdivisions in 1916, it continued to operate in English to a large extent up to the present day.

After colonialism.

In the final section of this lecture, I want to describe the policies of some of the immediate post-independence governments and the manner in which they sometimes inherited but radically re-interpreted colonial ideologies and practices. When theorists speak of the postcolonial, they often apply little sense of time to it. My sense is that the postcolonial era lasted from about 1950 to the 1990s. Hereafter, the long term effects of colonial rule were still apparent, especially in the areas I have already discussed such as ideologies of race, religion and, of course, as others have argued, in economic differentials. But world societies had developed in new directions. We have now moved beyond the postcolonial, except perhaps as an academic tool.

The inheritance of colonial thought and practice in post-independence societies was very uneven, often reflecting wartime experience and the form of the anti-colonial struggle. In Indochina, the impact of the Japanese invasion and nationalist wars against the French and later Americans, erased much of the structure and ideologies of colonial rule. The French language and French Marxist ideology still had purchase amongst the Vietnamese elites which led the Party, especially because many of them worked in African societies which also had a French colonial history, as Susan Bayly has indicated. In Indonesia where Japanese rule had also been imposed and the Dutch had been unable to reassert their power, economic collapse, Islamic revival and the anti-Communist civil war of the

1960s, only the very long-term consequences of colonial rule in economic inequalities and ethnic differences between the islands were apparent by the 1980s.

Across much of the rest of Asia and particularly Africa, often not decolonised to the 1960s, the impact of colonial rule and colonial ideologies was more pervasive and longer lasting. During the independence era, the earlier themes of national and social idealism were absorbed into rather than displaced by ideas of democracy, developmentalism and science, as a whole generation of colonial leaders was brought into direct contact with European, American and Japanese radical academics. After all, Jawaharlal Nehru had once been a theosophist before he replaced this with an idolisation of science. But the shift was palpable. Gandhi was indeed a latter day idealist: the village community and its councils were for him perfect societies. Yet for Nehru and his co-workers, such as D. R. Gadgil, the panchayat or local council was at best a structured low-level organisation to push forward economic change in the context of the new Five-Year plans; the so-called Panchayati Raj. So in the long term, the 'colonial knowledge' of British philosophers such as James and John Stuart Mill and Henry Maine, which had cast these bodies as the primitive societies at the base of despotism, had been challenged, first, by the assertion that they were really original democratic institutions; then that they were premonitions of an ideal society. Finally, in the twentieth century, they were to become agents of economic development and social engineering. In this sense, post-colonial ideologies and practice across much of the world can be seen as historically contingent amalgams of ideologies and practices created both by colonialism and by anti-colonial appropriations of many its forms.

There were similar developments in empires of knowledge elsewhere in the colonial world. The myth of the original Arabic *shura* or 'consultation' was transformed into a claim for political representation. In East Africa, Julius Nyerere's village developmental system, called *ujamaa*, or 'family-hood' was to become the basis of the socialist state after 1962. The ideological basis of ujamaa was, not unlike panchayati raj in India, a blending of ideas of indigenous village-level self-reliance, which was intended to break down 'tribalisation', merged with elements of British Fabian guild socialism. But

whereas Gadgil's or Nehru's programmes remained politically liberal in the manner of the 'guild socialist', Harold Laski's, original teaching, Nyerere's project soon became oppressive, forcibly moving rural people into new villages, in a small-scale version of Mao's 'great leap forward', but one that also drew on precedents in colonial rule.

A general ideological move in late colonial and early post-colonial society was towards a contextualisation of developmentalism in economic history and theory. In part this resulted, again, from a radicalisation of colonial economic knowledge and practice. Even before the great depression, Frank Swettenham had written on the village and the plantation system in *British Malaya*. J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India*, dwelling on local credit systems and Malcolm Darling's disquisition on the Punjab peasant 'in prosperity and debt' were more obviously products of the 1930s crisis. Nationalist writers took up these themes and imbued them with a profound sense of local grievance and also knowledge of wider economic ideas. So, one of Nehru's close collaborators, Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, used his knowledge of corvee labour in the North Indian hills, alongside radical political economy, to assail British economic policy. We find him in vigorous dispute in 1936 with the Finance Member of the Indian Government. Pant argued that if Britain had already moved away from *laissez faire* and was inspired in its programmes of house-building by major economists and politicians, such as Lloyd George, Roosevelt, John Maynard Keynes and Harold Laski, how was it that the Indian Government still adhered to rigid ideas of small government?[2] Gadgil himself wrote a detailed economic History of India, which contextualised the work of the earlier statistical liberals. Even Nehru's *Discovery of India*, written in a British jail, contained long sections on the destruction wrought by unbalanced capitalism in British India.

Knowledge of wider economic thought did not necessarily lead late colonial and early independence nationalists to the same forms of state intervention. Like Nehru, Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore was influenced by Fabianism in Britain. But as leader of the independent country, now severed from Malaysia, he was more profoundly responsive to the American free-market model. Speaking in Delhi in 2005, he lamented the bureaucratisation of Nehru's India. He said he had abandoned Fabian-style welfareism in

Singapore because it 'sapped the people's self-reliance'. Rather than pushing for industrialisation through import substitution and holding multi-nationals at arms length, he invited them in and achieved a much higher level of growth. All the same, the state did not 'wither away.' On the contrary, Lee approved state control of media, punishments including the whipping of miscreants and intervention in family life characteristic of colonialism in the colony, but now legitimated by the national concept. The themes of the politician as society's doctor, curing the disease of backwardness through eugenic planning were widely found throughout Southeast Asia after the 1950s. The Malaysian leader Mahomed Mahathir, for instance, produced a eugenic version of the old colonial conception of the plural society. But these were not always simple adaptations. Burhanuddin, president of the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party, resorted to Sufi as well as homeopathic medical knowledge in his writing on the Malay race and social planning.

 In trying to build a more cohesive and disciplined Chinese citizen in Southeast Asia, then Lee Kwan Yew was reflecting and adapting some of the tropes of race and eugenics which a significant feature of late colonial nationalism. Omnia Elshakry's outstanding *The Great Social Laboratory* shows how contemporary Egyptian intellectuals moved on from British and French colonial stereotypes of the fellahin towards a social engineering of the peasantry, using social psychology, geography and population studies. In India, deeply connected with British scientific thought and its racism, this turn was particularly associated with another of Jawaharlal Nehru's aides, P. C. Mahalanobis.

For Mahalanobis, progress was dependent on knowledge: knowledge of irrigation statistics, of educational statistics and particular on statistics about the size, shape and capabilities of people. In 1925 he had published a paper on the characteristics of Calcutta's Anglo-Indians based on measurements of the skull size, nasal length, etc.[3] He concluded that these families were the result of unions between upper caste Hindus and Europeans. There is definitely a whiff of eugenics about this and a later 'anthropometric study of the United Provinces,[4] though it did not display the almost pathological social Darwinism of Mahalanobis's British mentor, Karl Pearson, mentioned earlier. Yet we see here an Indian 'colonisation' of what Nicholas Dirks has called 'the ethnographic state.'

Colonial knowledge of 'tribes and castes' was appropriated and transformed into a national project by the Indian Statistical Institute and the National Sample Survey which Mahalanobis led. All these statistical tools were deployed in support of Nehru's centralised developmental planning during the 1950s and early 60s. The new state had to be inhabited by new citizens and these citizens had to be created by better breeding. This subtle and largely unrecognised eugenic mode of early nationalist thought in India, and in other newly independent countries was later manifest in the projects to sterilise and expel the poor and idle, who happened generally to be low castes and untouchables, from India's cities during Indira Gandhi's Emergency of the 1970s.

The social role of the new state was to be complemented by its political intervention through positive discrimination. The idea of democracy, republicanism and universal suffrage, American or Soviet style, replaced the colonial conception of societies ordered through natural leaders and elite representation. But much of the nationalist leadership also envisioned the state as a direct agent of equalisation. B. R. Ambedkar, *dalit* or untouchable leade, failed in the 1930s to secure special electoral concessions for them in the 1930s. But as a major architect of India's constitution he did ensure guaranteed access to government employment. This was extended to Other Backward Castes by the Mandal Commission in the 1990s. Ambedkar's intellectual insurgency on behalf of this cause saw him radicalising the thought of his liberal mentor at Columbia University, John Dewey, and also ransacking old English and modern American history to legitimate the rights of the untouchables. As I mentioned earlier, having attacked the village so beloved of other nationalists as a 'sink of backwardness' almost in the manner of the early Marx, he later urged his followers to turn to Buddhism as the only way of breaking the chains of Hindu casteism. Ironically, perhaps, the Buddhism he revered was the ultra rational Buddhism or the late nineteenth century European Orientalists, not the Buddhism of Southeast Asia. To a greater or lesser extent, then, the notion of an original democratic unit, combined with positive discrimination by the state, based on racial analysis and statistics, appeared in many late nationalist and early post-independence knowledge systems and practices. This reflected a spectrum from what I would call epistemic insurgency to conceptual 'lodging' in and adaptation of earlier colonial forms.

The weak form of lodging was represented by what post-colonial theorists, such as Homi Bhabha, citing the novelist V. S. Naipaul, have called the proliferation of 'mimic men' who simply reproduced the ideas of colonial knowledge as they were diffused by European dominance. At the other end of the scale, colonised intellectuals simply rejected European knowledge as false and oppressive, sometimes adopting a dismissive form of mimicry: as when Gandhi laughed off the 'Mills and the Spencers' in his *Hind Swaraj*. Between these two poles most indigenous intellectuals and political practitioners attempted to colonise and inhabit colonial knowledge systems, as it were. During the idealist phase of nationalism before the First World War, for instance, 'counter-preachers' such as Rashid Rida or Aurobindo Ghose inveighed against Western inhumanity and invoked the Life Divine. During the last scientist and eugenicist period of epistemic insurgency figures such as Lee Kwan Yew, Hassan al Banna, or in a very different way, Mao Zedong, announced the creation of a more perfectly evolved and disciplined human being. These ideas still resonate in the twenty-first century. In many respects, 'post-colonial knowledge' adapted and refashioned the earlier empires of 'colonial knowledge' while rejecting their inherent racism and ideas of cultural supremacy.

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[1] 'Why they shot Malala', Daily Telegraph, 22 July 2013

[2] Ibid., pp. 140-1.

[3] Ibid., p. 135.

[4] Ibid. 136